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Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 20030367 CA 
Trial Court No. 970903755 CV 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, STATE OF UTAH 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellee State of Utah will track the designations as given in Appellant's 
Brief: Interested Party/Appellant, Bruce Petersen will be referred to as Petersen 
and Plaintiff/Appellee State of Utah will be referred to as State, with the other 
designations as outlined by Petersen also being adopted. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all cases transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Constitution art. VII, § 5, and Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE: Did the Trial Court Properly Deny Petersen's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment Where Petersen Based his Motion on a 
Procedural Issue That Was Not Originally Raised and Was Thus Waived? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. Black's Title Inc. v. 
Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Kate 
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
SECOND ISSUE: Does the Forfeiture of Real Property That Is 
Proceeds of Narcotic Activity Involve a Deprivation of Liberty Interest, 
Where Liberty Interest Refers Only to Personal Liberty Under Case Law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Review for correctness. Coulter & Smith, 
LTD. V. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 
736, 739 (Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1979). 
THIRD ISSUE: Does the Forfeiture of Real Property That Represents 
Proceeds of Narcotic Activity Invoke An Exceptional Circumstance When 
Petersen Had Ample Opportunity to Raise the Rule 4 Issue at Both Trial and 
Appellate Levels? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Review for correctness. Coulter & Smith, 
LTD. V. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 
2 
736, 739 (Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1979). 
FOURTH ISSUE: Did the Trial Court Properly Deny the Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment Where the Original Service of Process and 
Subsequent Judgment Followed the Proscribed Service Requirements, 
Petersen Failed to Answer, Judgment Was Granted, Motions to Set Aside 
Were Heard and Denied, an Appeal Taken, and the Rulings Affirmed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. Black's Title Inc. v. 
Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Katz 
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertain and 
appear in full text in the argument section or addendum, or within and cited to 
Petersen's Addendum: 
UTAH CONST., art. VII, § 5. 
UtahR. App. P. 10. 
Utah R.Civ. P. 1 
Utah R.Civ. P. 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b) and (h) 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-13(2) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-13(9) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal from a ruling and Order Denying Petersen's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Judge Henriod's order denying the 
Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment was based upon the failure of Petersen to 
raise his Rule 4 service of process issue at the original trial and appellate levels, 
consequent waiver of the issue, and a contravention of judicial economy and the 
appellate process. (See Ex. A & B). This case was previously heard by this Court 
of Appeals based upon a similar attack on service. Upon that hearing, this Court 
affirmed the original order of default judgment, and the denial of Claimant's (first) 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, finding that service was proper under applicable 
statutes. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
The State is satisfied with Petersen's statement of course of proceedings. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court Below: 
The Trial Court denied Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 
filed after this Court of Appeals ruled that service of process was proper under 
governing statutes in the original trial proceeding. 
D. Plenary Statement of Facts: 
1. On or about May 14, 1997, the defendant property, consisting of 
Appellant's home and real estate located at 736 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah, was seized incident to the execution of search and seizure warrants, 
incident to the discovery of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory located on 
and in the home and property. The search and seizure warrant was issued by the 
Third District Court, Judge Michael Hutchings. 
2. Based upon a belief by the DEA/Metro Narcotics Task Force and by 
the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office that the defendant property was 
forfeitable, a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture was filed by the State, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (Supp. 1996) against the seized home and real 
property on May 30, 1997. (Record, [hereafter "R."] 1). 
3. On or about May 30, 1997, a copy of the Verified Complaint for 
Forfeiture in this matter, along with a Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit 
was mailed, pursuant to statute, to all persons who appeared to be interested 
parties, at their respective last known addresses. This included Beehive Bail 
Bonds at 268 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Petersen at 736 North 
Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25). 
4. On or about June 4, 2003, a Lis Pendens was also recorded with the 
County Recorder's Office, and on June 13, that Lis Pendens was filed. (R. 6). 
5. Knowing that Appellant's mail was requested forwarded, the United 
States Postal Service changed the mailing address of the certified mail for the 
Appellant to 626 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25). 
6. By affidavit, Petersen acknowledges that he was residing at 626 
North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah from February 8, 1997 through June 
23, 1997, during the time certified mailing of the Notice and complaint were left 
and went unclaimed. (R. 41). 
7. The certified mail sent to the Appellant's correct and actual address 
of 626 North Colorado Street was returned after the United States Postal Service 
left notice of the certified mail on three separate occasions. (R. 25). 
8. An application for the entry of the default of the non-answering 
Appellant and Beehive Bail Bonds was thereafter submitted to the Court, and the 
respective defaults of each of the potential interested parties was entered by the 
Court on August 11, 1997. (R. 15-16). Thereafter, Judgment of Forfeiture was 
entered against all potential interested parties, including Appellant, on August 11, 
1997. (R. 11-12). 
9. On November 4, 1997, a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was 
filed by Mark T. Ethington on behalf of the Appellant. (R. 20). A memorandum 
in support thereof was never submitted, nor was any request for decision advanced 
by Mr. Ethington on Appellant's behalf. (R. 20). 
10. On November 12, 1999, Mr. Wall entered his formal appearance 
herein, and filed a memorandum in support of the November 4, 1997 Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 26). 
11. On December 2, 1999, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default. (R. 45). 
12. On December 27, 1999, the Third District Court, Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod, presiding, issued a minute entry in which the Court denied Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment. (R. 54). 
13. On January 5, 2000, the State submitted proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, as well as a proposed Order denying the Motion to 
Vacate the Default Judgment. (R. 56). 
14. On January 11, 2000, the Court, Judge Henriod presiding, adopted as 
its own, signed and entered the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 56 - 61). 
15. On January 13, 2000, a Motion for Reconsideration or in the 
Alternative to Make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with an 
accompanying memorandum was filed by Appellant. (R. 66). 
16. On February 3, 2000, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 72). 
17. On February 18, 2000, Appellant filed a "Response to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration". 
(R. 79). 
18. On March 8, 2000, the Court issued a Minute Entry, summarily 
denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make 
Alternative Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Request for Hearing, 
without any finding. (R. 93). 
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19. On August 21, 2000, the Court entered its Order Denying Bruce 
Peterson's Motion For Reconsideration. (R. 95). 
20. On August 31, 2000, the parties hereto entered into a Stipulation, in 
which the State agreed that the time for filing an appeal from the Court's January 
11, 2000 Order Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment 
would commence on August 31, 2000, the date of the entry of the Court's Order 
Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 98). 
21. On September 18, 2001, Petersen filed his (first) notice of Appeal. 
(R. 100). 
22. On November 29, 2001, this Court held that the State's Service of 
the Notice of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit were properly served on Petersen 
through certified mailing. (R. 111-115). 
23. On March 5, 2002, Petersen filed a Second Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, with supporting Memorandum and Attachments, at the trial court level. 
(R. 117-143). 
24. On March 21, 2002, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition 
to (Second) Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 148-156). 
25. On February 11, 2003, Petersen filed a Reply Memorandum. (R. 
159-165). 
26. On March 18, 2003, Third District Judge Stephen L. Henriocl issued 
a minute entry denying Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 
168-169). 
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27. On March 28, 2003, Third District Court, Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying 
Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 171-174). 
28. On April 21, 2003, Petersen filed his (second) Notice of Appeal 
from Judge Henriod's denial of the Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 
175-176). 
29. On or about May 28, 2003, the State filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
30. On or about July 10, 2003, Petersen filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
31. On October 21, 2003, this Court denied the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Petersen's second 
motion to set aside judgment based upon defective service was improperly brought 
because the issue was not originally raised and was therefore waived under Utah 
law. What is more, the default judgment of forfeiture does not involve a 
deprivation of liberty interest or exceptional circumstances, and therefore cannot 
create an exception that would allow review of Petersen's new attack on service of 
process. As the trial court noted, to allow Petersen to re-start the action by 
bringing new issues after having the opportunity to raise them at trial and appellate 
levels would be a contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process. 
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Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petersen's 
Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment because the service of process was proper 
under the service rules promulgated by our legislature for these civil in rem 
forfeitures; the service was in fact appropriate to the nature of the case; and, this 
Court had already held that the service of process was proper and that Petersen had 
waived the newer service argument. Therefore, the trial court order denying 
Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside should be affirmed. 
The State also renews its motion for summary disposition pursuant 1o Rule 
10(f) following plenary presentation and consideration of the case. 
PLENARY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETERSEN'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE MOTION 
WAS BASED UPON A PROCEDURAL ISSUE THAT WAS NOT 
ORIGINALLY RAISED AND WAS THUS WAIVED 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Petersen's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment because the attack Petersen sought to bring, 
namely defective personal service under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure ("Rule 4") (Petersen's Addendum A), was not properly raised at the 
original trial and appellate levels, and was properly deemed waived for failure to 
raise under Utah Law. 
It is important to note that the trial court's denial of Petersen's second 
motion came following review of extensive pleadings, and this Court's own 
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decision determining that the attack on service of process had been waived. See 
All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 277 fn 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The trial court's 
decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, Black's Title Inc. 
v. Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), and for the reasons discussed cannot 
be considered an abuse of discretion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals made clear in its original decision affirming the 
August 11, 1997 order of default judgment that the very grounds Petersen raises 
here have been waived. After determining that personal service was not required 
under the plain language of the forfeiture statute and that the original service of 
process was proper, this Court noted in footnote 4 that Petersen's alternate 
personal service argument could not be addressed for failure to raise. Footnote 4 
of that decision stated: 
For claimant to raise the issue of defective service of the complaint on 
appeal, he must have raised it below. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1066-1067 (Utah 1991); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 12 
(h) (stating lack of jurisdiction for defective service can be waived). 
Claimant has also failed to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances 
on appeal. Accordingly, we cannot address the argument. See State v. 
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, | 8, 9 P.3d 164. 
State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278, FN4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Rather 
than take instruction from the footnote, Petersen treats the footnote as an invitation 
to litigate ad infinitum, at the cost of fair judicial process. 
That Petersen's alternate service of process argument is waived is clear 
under Utah rules of procedure and case law. Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b) and (h) provides: 
n 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, 
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: ... (5) insufficiency of service of process.... 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply.... 
In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered Rule 12 and the question of whether the defense of 
insufficiency of service of process is one that becomes waived for failure to raise. 
That Court held: 
It is evident that the policy of Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to require all such motions to be presented for decision early 
and all at the same time so as to promote judicial efficiency and to reduce 
litigation expenses. We therefore hold that the affirmative defense of 
defective service of process is barred by waiver. 
Also dispositive of the affirmative defense issue is the failure on the part of 
Foa to specifically raise the issue of defective service of process at the time 
of the summary judgment hearing. 
Id. at 1067. 
Given the foregoing analysis and rule of law, the trial court below properly 
denied Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment when it concluded that 
Petersen had waived the personal service argument, and that his attempt at re-
restarting the case under that modified attack would frustrate judicial economy and 
the appellate process. For these reasons the trial court's decision was not an abuse 
of discretion, and this Court should affirm the denial of Petersen's Second Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment. 
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POINT II 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A LIBERTY INTEREST THAT 
PERMITS A REVIEW OF PETERSEN'S LATELY STYLED 
ATTACK ON THE 1997 SERVICE OF PROCESS 
This Court should affirm the trial court's order denying Petersen's new 
motion to set aside based on service of process because this case in no way 
involves a deprivation of liberty interest that would allow him to raise the issue 
now. In an unpublished opinion1, this Court defined a liberty interest, stating 
"[s]tate-created liberty interests ... are 'generally limited to freedom from restraint 
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give 
rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes 
atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.'" Straley v. Galetka, 2000 UT App 348, citing Perkins v. 
Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 805, 808 (10th Cir.1999) quoting Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (provided as Ex. C). 
Petersen errs when suggesting that the forfeiture of real property linked to 
narcotics trafficking amounts to a similar liberty interest that would allow his new 
attack on service despite the failure to raise it below. Petersen cites as support for 
his ability to raise the issue State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-803 (Utah 1990) 
and State v. Beckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). Both cases coincide 
only with Straley, not his own, because they involved persons whose actual liberty 
1
 The unpublished opinion is provided as Ex. C as being useful, authoritative, or 
persuasive. See Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 (Utah 2002). 
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interests were at stake. In those rare cases the court properly allowed 
consideration of issues not originally raised below. Petersen haphazardly attempts 
to connect these true liberty interest cases to others that do not involve a liberty 
interest at all, thus bootstrapping the notion that his new service of process 
argument should be allowed fresh consideration. As discussed below, the 
argument fails. 
The State agrees that a deprivation of property ought to be accompanied by 
process that is "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mulane v. Central Bank of 
Hanover & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). However, Mulane and other 
cases cited by Petersen actually support the service of process conducted in this 
case, while none of them stand for the proposition that the Petersen can raise his 
new attack some seven years after the original trial proceeding. 
In Mulane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the court considered the service of process 
of numerous beneficiaries to a common trust fund and found that mere publication 
to persons whose addresses were actually known was not sufficient. The court 
held that, as to the persons whose addresses were known, there was "no tenable 
ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them personally of the 
accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record addresses." Id. at 318. It is 
important to note that Mulane was not considering the issue for the first time on 
appeal, yet it held that service by mail was sufficient. In this case, the State made 
a serious effort, in accordance with statute, using certified mail sent to the 
Petersen's correct and actual address of 626 North Colorado Street, where 
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Petersen acknowledges he was living at the time, which was returned after the 
United States Postal Service left notice of the certified mail on three separate 
occasions. (R. 25 & 41). 
Additionally, in Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990) 
certi. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990), cited by Petersen, the court held that vehicle 
owners were not deprived of their property without due process because the city 
had mailed notice of its intention to remove and abate the vehicles. (A civil 
judgment was awarded against the department for later entering the property, 
breaking down a fence, and taking the cars, all without a warrant). Again, in 
Conner the court did not consider the issue for the first time on appeal, but 
ultimately found service by mail was sufficient. Id. at 1489-90. 
The other cases Petersen relies upon are similarly distinguished. See 
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 51 (1962) (issue not heard first on appeal, 
involved confession of 14 year old murder suspect); Kentucky Dept. of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (issue not heard first on 
appeal, involved procedures relating to visitation privileges of inmates); Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 236-237 (1940) (issue was passed by jury, but heard by court, 
involving confessions obtained against defendants sentenced to death.) 
Taken together, Petersen's contention that drug forfeitures of real property 
amounts to a deprivation of liberty interest that creates an exception to allow him 
to raise new issues on appeal is unfounded. What is more, Utah case law, and 
even the law cited by the Petersen, demonstrates that no liberty interest was 
1 ^ 
involved in this case, while the original 1997 service of process was proper and 
appropriate to the nature of the case. The trial court order denying the Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD ALLOW PETERSEN'S NEW 
ATTACK ON SERVICE BECAUSE THE RULE 4 SERVICE ISSUE 
WAS NOT FUTILE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AT 
THE ORIGINAL TRIAL AND APPELLATE STAGES 
Petersen's failure to raise his newly styled attack on service of process is 
not an exceptional circumstance because the argument was not foreclosed at the 
trial or appellate levels, and was not futile at any stage. As a general rule, courts 
of appeal do not consider issues, to include constitutional issues, which are not 
properly raised at the trial level. State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278 FN5 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001); State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
This case is different, even from these, because Petersen seeks to raise an issue 
that was not, but could have been raised at both the trial and appellate court levels. 
This request is at odds with case law, fairness, and res judicata. 
In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994), relied upon by 
Petersen, the court held that an exceptional circumstance existed to allow a 
convicted person to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that gave a court 
commissioner judicial authority of courts of record and the ultimate power of 
entering final judgments and imposing sentence in contravention with article VIII 
of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court, holding that such power did violate 
1£ 
the Utah Constitution, noted that the issue was properly raised first on appeal 
because, of course, the only way to challenge the statute was to have the case 
heard by a commissioner, and then challenge that conviction. Id. Thus, an 
exceptional circumstance actually existed in that case. 
This case is nothing like Ohms because it was not futile for Petersen to 
raise his new claim under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure at either the 
trial or appellate levels. An analysis of Petersen's own argument proves the point. 
Petersen contends that because the original complaint was filed under Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-13(2)(k) (involving proceeds), service should be governed by § 
58-37-13(9)(c), which Petersen contends is silent to service of the complaint, and 
thus invokes Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While Petersen's 
analysis is mistaken in that it ignores § 58-37-13(9)(d) and (f), which does address 
service of complaints in civil in rem actions, the thrust of Petersen's own argument 
demands that it be brought at both the trial level and original appellate level 
because it involves the totality of the service of process under due process of law. 
Indeed, to suggest that the trial court or the appellate could not consider these 
issues stands against all reason because the Rule 4 argument itself is only a 
corollary to the Notice of Intent to Seize issue, as already argued by Petersen 
himself It therefore could not have been futile to raise the issue, and Petersen's 
exceptional circumstance argument must fail. 
What is more, there is no support in case law for the notion that parties may 
fail to raise an issue at an appellate level, determine after an appellate ruling an 
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entirely new route to take, then re-litigate starting at the trial court level some six-
plus years after the original judgment, and then claim exceptional circumstances. 
To do so would be a contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process, 
just as the trial court found. It would encourage parties to engage in seemingly 
endless litigation. It would cause prejudice to prevailing parties, in this case, for 
example, by requiring the State to marshal antiquated evidence and witnesses for a 
matter it prevailed upon nearly seven (7) years ago. Such a result frustrates 
fairness and the great endeavor of justice, res judicata. 
ISSUE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETERSEN'S 
SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BASING ITS DECISION 
ON THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, TO INCLUDE PROPER 
SERVICE, OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Petersen's second 
motion to set aside judgment because service was and has been ruled proper, 
Petersen had full opportunity to be heard, and the rulings of the trial court had 
been affirmed. The minute opinion issued by the lower court, Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding, (Ex. A), demonstrates that the court was fully informed in the 
premises before entering the order denying Petersen's second motion to set aside 
judgment. That order was not an abuse of discretion, and it should stand. 
A. The Service Was Proper. 
To begin, the service of process in this case was proper because it followed 
the special service requirements set out by our legislature. Succinctly, even if this 
1R 
Court looks at the question of whether personal service of the complaint and 
notice was required under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4, it should find that 
personal service under Rule 4 was not necessary, and that service was in fact 
proper. Under Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of 
the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, 
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory 
proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by this 
court or enacted by the Legislature ... 
Id. (emphasis added). The Utah legislature recognized the quasi-criminal and 
unique nature of civil in rem asset forfeitures cases brought under the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act and promulgated a set of procedural requirements 
specifically intended for these civil in rem cases. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 
was thus supplanted by the requirements of U.C.A. § 58-37-13 et. seq., to include 
section 58-37-13(9) (d) and (f), governing service. 
This procedural framework ensured that the State give adequate notice of 
both the seizure of the property, and the intended forfeiture of the property, to all 
non state-charged persons known to exist that might have an interest, by certified 
mail. Under U.C.A. § 58-37-13(9) (f) no judgment could enter until after service 
of the complaint was so made. Here, the required Notice and Complaint was 
mailed, via certified mail, to Petersen's last known address, and was forwarded to, 
and attempted to be delivered at, 626 North Colorado Street, the address at which 
Petersen stated by affidavit was his residence from February 8, 1997 through June 
23, 1997, the period the certified mail arrived. (R. 41). In words taken from 
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Petersen's own brief, this service was "appropriate to the nature of the case." See 
Mulane v. Central Bank of Hanover & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) and 
Petersen's Brief at 19. 
B. This Court Held Service Was Proper and the New Issue Waived 
This Court previously held that the service was proper and that the Rule 4 
issue had been waived. See State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2001). Specifically, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9), read 
as a whole "confirms that the personal service provisions of the Notice apply only 
to defendants in a state criminal prosecution, where the forfeiture is pursued as a 
part of the criminal case." Id. It was here that this Court noted in FN5 of the 
opinion the fact that it could not address the issue of whether the complaint and 
summons had to be personally served under Rule 4 because Petersen had failed to 
properly raise the argument. Id. The trial court, with this Court's decision in 
hand, properly denied the Petersen's second motion to set aside judgment on the 
very rationale given by this Court. 
C. The Original Judgment Is Fair and Should Stand 
Finally, the default judgment was fair and should stand because Petersen 
had an opportunity to be heard, and each ruling denying Petersen's motion(s) to 
set aside judgment were not an abuse of discretion. While default judgments are 
not generally favored, Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 
P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980), the decision in Black's Title Inc. v. Utah State 
on 
Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) most closely 
resembles this case, and is highly instructive. 
In Black's Title, the Utah State Insurance Department initiated an 
adjudicative proceeding against Black's business by mailing notice of the 
proceeding via certified mail. Id. at 609. Despite efforts at locating Black, Black 
asserted that he never received the mailings, and sought a motion to set aside 
default judgment after he failed to answer. Id. Black could no longer earn an 
income due to the ruling. Black moved to set aside the judgment under Utah Rule 
of Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6). Id. at 610. In reviewing the denial of the motion to 
set aside judgment, the Black's Title court noted that to be relieved, Black first had 
to show the motion was timely and that he had a meritorious defense. Id. Black 
did both of these, but the Court still affirmed the denial, stating that while "some 
basis may exist to set aside the default[, we will not conclude the Commissioner] 
abused [his] discretion in refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances 
support the refusal." Id at 610 citing Katz, 732 P.2d at 93. 
Here Petersen was similarly served with notice by certified mail. Here too 
he claims he did not get it. But in this case Petersen has never shown that he 
actually has a meritorious defense to the underlying complaint. See State ex rel 
Utah State Dep't. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
What is more, a post-appeal motion to set aside judgment does not seem timely. 
Added to these, the service was proper under the statute in this case and this Court 
had affirmed the trial court's first denial of Petersen's first motions to set aside 
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judgment. Under these circumstances, it is folly to suggest that the trial court 
committed plain error, let alone that it abused its discretion. The ruling denying 
Petersen's second motion to set aside judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petersen's service of process argument under Rule 4 is improperly before 
this Court now as it was at the first appeal because it was waived for failure to 
raise under Utah law. Moreover, a drug related forfeiture of real property does not 
constitute deprivation of a liberty interest or exceptional circumstances such that 
the issue may now be brought. To do so would invite litigation ad infinitum, and 
strike at the heart of res judicata. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the second motion to set aside judgment where service of the 
notice and complaint were proper under applicable statutes promulgated by our 
legislature and this Court had already affirmed that the service was proper and that 
the new issue was waived. 
For the foregoing reasons the State respectfully asks that this Court affirm 
the trial court order denying Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, and renews its motion for summary disposition following plenary 
consideration. 
Dated this g>_ day of March, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Deputy District Attorney 
•T) 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE & 
APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 736 
NORTH COLORADO STREET, SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 9709903755 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Defendant's Second Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment is 
before this Court for decision pursuant to a Notice To Submit filed 
on February 11, 2 0 03. 
On August 11, 1997 the court entered a default judgment of 
forfeiture against defendant Peterson's property. In response, 
Peterson filed both a Motion To Set Aside the Judgment and a Motion 
for Reconsideration. Both motions were summarily denied. On 
September 28, 2001, Peterson filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah 
Court of Appeals. In an opinion issued on November 29, 2001, the 
Court of Appeals ruled that the State's service of the notice of 
seizure/intent to forfeit had been properly served on Peterson. 
Furthermore, as to Peterson's argument that the State failed to 
personally serve claimant, the appellate court concluded, citing to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (h), that it was unable to address 
that argument because Peterson had failed to raise the issue with 
the Court below. 
Now, upon consideration of defendant's second motion for 
default judgment, this Court rules, in accordance with the Utah 
STATE OF UTAH V. PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
ALL REAL PROPERTY 
ET. AL. 
Court of Appeals, that Peterson's claim of defective service is 
improperly before this Court because the issue was not originally 
raised. See, Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & Son 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1991)(holding defense of insufficiency of service of process is 
waived for failure to raise) ; See also, URCP 12 (b) (h) . Here, 
Peterson does not get the opportunity to raise certain issues with 
the trial court, appeal the trial court's decision, lose on appeal 
and then start over by bringing new issues in the district court. 
To allow such actions would clearly be in contravention of judicial 
economy as well as the appellate process. 
For the above mentioned reasons, defendant's motion is hereby 
denied. The State of Utah to prepare an Order consistent with this 
Minute Entry. 
BY THE COURT: . \ ^ 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD -* 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 970903755 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail CHAD PLATT 
ATTORNEY PLA 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail STEVEN B WALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
4460 S HIGHLAND DRIVE 
SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124 
Dated this )S day of ]V\C\(iCjr\ , 2p/^)'2^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
ADDENDUM B 
(EX. B) 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHAD L. PLATT, 8475 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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Third Judicial District 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE & 
APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 736 
NORTH COLORADO STREET, SALT 
LAKE, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 9709003755 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Claimant Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment came before this Court 
pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed February 11, 2003. Claimant Petersen is represented by 
counsel, Steven B. Wall, and Plaintiff State of Utah is represented by counsel. The Court having 
received and reviewed the various memoranda submitted, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Verified Complaint for forfeiture was filed against the defendant lot of property 
on or about May 30, 1997. 
2. Plaintiff State of Utah served its Notice of Intent to Forfeit upon Claimant 
Petersen by certified mail pursuant to the requirements of U.C.A. § 58-37-
13(9)(d). 
3. On August 11, 1997 this Court entered a default judgment of forfeiture against 
Petersen's property. 
4. Petersen subsequently filed both a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and a Motion 
for Reconsideration, which were summarily denied. 
5. Petersen filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals on September 
28,2001. 
6. On November 29, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the State's service 
of the Notice of Seizure and Notice of Intent to Forfeit had been properly served. 
Further, specifically addressing Petersen's argument that he had not been 
personally served, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded, citing to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(h), that is was unable to address that argument because 
Petersen failed to raise it at the trial court. 
7. On February 28, 2002, following the Utah Court of Appeals decision which 
affirmed the default judgment entered by this Court, Petersen filed a Second 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment with this Court, again raising the insufficiency of 
service of process argument that Petersen was not personally served. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petersen's claim of defective service is improperly before this Court because the 
issue was not originally raised, and is therefore waived. See Watkiss & Campbell 
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)(holding defense of insufficiency of 
service of process is waived for failure to raise); See also, URCP 12(b)(h). 
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2. To allow Petersen to re-start the action by bringing new issues in the district 
court, after having the opportunity to raise issues at the trial and appellate levels, 
would be in contravention of judicial economy and the appellate process. See 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Claimant Petersen's Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this day of _ I/U^LA ,2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form and content: 
Steven B. Wall 
Attorney for Claimant, Petersen 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, were mailed, postage pre-paid, to Claimant 
Petersen as addressed below, this _J\ day of March, 2003: 
Steven B. Wall 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Claimant Petersen 
4460 S. Highland Drive 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah 
Robert Dale STRALEY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Hank GALETKA, Defendant and Appellant 
No 990704-CA 
Dec 7,2000 
Robert Dale Straley, Draper, pro se 
Ian Giaham and James H Beadles, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee 
Before JACKSON, BENCH, and DAVIS, JJ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM 
*1 Appellant Robert Dale Straley appeals the 
dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief The 
district court dismissed the petition alleging violation 
of due process in two separate disciplinary 
proceedings that resulted in imposition of 30 days 
and 15 days in punitive isolation The court 
concluded that "the disciplinary actions did not result 
in deprivation of a protected liberty interest" 
"A prisoner's liberty interests may arise from either 
the Due Process Clause itself or from state law " 
Perkins v Kansas Dept of Corrections 165 F 3d 
805, 808 (10th Cirl999) "State-created liberty 
interests are 'generally limited to freedom from 
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in 
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to 
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own 
force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant 
hardship on the inmate m relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life' " Id (quoting San dm \ 
Connei M U J S 472 484 (1995)) Straley did not 
allege in district court that the period of punitive 
isolation imposed an "atypical and significant 
hardship " See Sandm v Conna 59S U S 472, 486, 
US S ( t 2293 2301 (1995) (holding 30 days in 
segregated confinement "did not present the type of 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 1 
atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 
might conceivably create a liberty interest") Because 
Straley did not allege a significant or atypical 
hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison 
life, the district court did not err in dismissing the 
petition for failure to state a claim 
Straley further contends that because a prison 
disciplinary record may impact parole decisions 
under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, a 
liberty interest arises that must be protected by due 
process He claims an October 15, 1998 decision of 
the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole setting his case 
for rehearing was based "solely" upon his prison 
disciplinary record However, the rationale for the 
decision listed seven aggravating factors, including 
the prison disciplinary record, and three mitigating 
factors Straley's claim is entirely speculative Sandin 
suggested due process may be required if the sanction 
imposed "will inevitably affect the duration of a 
[prisoner's] sentence", however, the court found 
nothing in Hawaii's laws that required its parole 
board to grant or deny parole based upon misconduct, 
although prison conduct was a relevant consideration 
Id at 487 Accordingly, the court concluded "the 
decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of 
considerations," and "[t]he chance that a finding of 
misconduct will alter the balance is simply too 
attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the 
Due Process Clause " Id Similarly, Utah statutes and 
regulations do not mandate denial of parole based 
upon a disciplinary record or require a grant of parole 
based upon absence of a disciplinary record Straley's 
disciplinary record was one of several factors noted 
in the Board's rationale for setting the case for 
rehearmg rather than grantmg parole The district 
court properly concluded that Straley had not 
demonstrated a basis to apply due process to his 
prison disciplinary proceedings 
*2 Accordmgly, we affirm the district court's 
dismissal of the petition 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Orig U S Govt Works 
ADDENDUM D 
(EX. D) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VII. §5 
(1) The executive power of the state shall be vested in the Governor who shall see 
that the laws are faithfully executed. 
(2) The Governor shall transact all executive business with the officers of the 
government, civil and military, and may require information in writing from the 
officers of the Executive Department, and from the officers and managers of state 
institutions upon any subject relating to the condition, management, and expenses 
of their respective offices and institutions. The Governor may at any time when 
the Legislature is not in session, if deemed necessary, appoint a committee to 
investigate and report to the Governor upon the condition of any executive office 
or state institution. I 
(3) The Governor shall communicate by message the condition of the state to the 
Legislature at every annual general session and recommend such measures as may 
be deemed expedient. 
(4) The Governor may appoint legal counsel to advise the Governor. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 10(f). Deferral of ruling. 
As to any issue raised by a motion for summary disposition, the court may defer 
its ruling until plenary presentation and consideration of the case. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state 
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable 
at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by 
other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as 
stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; 
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATES 58-37-13 (1996) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(2) 
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, 
or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including 
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for 
use to administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in 
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the 
conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know 
of the violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an 
interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the 
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, 
and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange 
for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be 
forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented 
to the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture. The burden of 
presenting this evidence shall be upon the state; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled 
substances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder 
who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of 
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the 
property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection 
if the interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the 
conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not 
willingly consent to the conduct; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on 
the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or 
the street value of any controlled substances found on the premises 
at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer 
experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to 
establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of 
this subsection; 
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation 
to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or 
located within the proximity of controlled substances or other property 
subject to forfeiture under this section; and 
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in 
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing 
equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable 
records of importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. The burden 
of proof is upon the claimant of the property to rebut this presumption. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(9)(a - f) 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint 
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, 
the district attorney, or the attorney general, and 
filed in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In 
cases in which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal 
defendant, the complaint shall be filed in the county where the criminal 
charges arose, regardless of the location of the property. The complaint 
shall include: 
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture. 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the 
forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in 
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to 
forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but 
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first 
appearance on the criminal charges. If a criminal information or indictment 
is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the defendant may respond 
to the demand at the time of the amendment. 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the 
determination of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the 
criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the court 
without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the 
criminal case, and receive any other evidence offered by the state or 
the defendant. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as it determines. 
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action, 
to stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for 
hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal 
charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of 
forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or all of the property, 
either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the court 
shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal 
charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to 
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate 
judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or 
transfer of the forfeiture action may not create a separate proceeding. 
Upon the granting of a motion by the defendant for disposition, stay, 
severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be 
considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has been 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, 
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to 
forfeiture under this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal 
of 
a complaint filed under this subsection. Following the entry of an in 
personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release 
under Subsection (e), the county attorney, district attorney, or 
attorney general may proceed with a separate in rem action to 
resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture, 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be 
prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the 
district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of a 
criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the 
property alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property 
is seized or encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the state. A 
finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not 
require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange or 
transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence 
which establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this 
chapter; 
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period 
when the conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a 
reasonable time after that period; and 
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than 
conduct in 
violation of the chapter. 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the clerk 
of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county attorney or 
district attorney to have a claim in the property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal 
information or indictment; and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known 
or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the 
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of 
the division, which service is considered complete even though the 
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district 
attorney, or attorney general shall make one publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was 
made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who 
are believed to have an interest in the property. 
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or 
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint 
within 20 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a 
complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having 
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall 
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it 
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a 
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who 
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a 
complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) For civil action in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint or 
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is 
no file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to 
present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of of 
the property as the court determines. If the county attorney or district 
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court 
determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery 
of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county attorney or 
district attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed 
within that period, the court shall order release of the property to the 
petitioner entitled to receive it. 
